Published on : 22/03/2025

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One Nation, One Election: Re-examining the Central–State Dynamics in Indian Federalism

Authored by (1) Mr. Shailendar K

 

(2) Kollu Anusri

 

Student of Law

 

Sastra Deemed University

 

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Abstract:

 

One Nation, One Election (ONOE)—the proposal to synchronize India’s national and state-level elections—is heralded by proponents as a measure to reduce electoral costs, streamline governance, and minimize the disruptive effects of continuous campaigning. Nonetheless, a closer examination suggests that ONOE poses significant threats to the country’s democratic framework. First, India’s federal structure could be undermined by compressing regional concerns into a unified, nationalized electoral narrative. Individual states, each with its distinct sociopolitical identity and policy priorities, risk seeing their voices diminished during a single, nationwide election. Local campaigns and issues might become secondary to high-profile national debates, weakening state autonomy and overshadowing regional leadership.

 

Second, more frequent elections offer a crucial mechanism for accountability. Staggered electoral cycles allow citizens to regularly evaluate the performance of officeholders, ensuring a measure of ongoing responsiveness. By contrast, a synchronized five-year interval would reduce opportunities to “keep politicians on a short leash,” potentially granting incumbents leeway to enact unpopular policies without fear of immediate electoral repercussions. In effect, this consolidation may embolden dominant parties or coalitions, especially if mid-term dissolutions are discouraged, limiting the electorate’s ability to trigger corrective measures between major election cycles.

 

Third, implementing ONOE raises complex constitutional and logistical challenges, as aligning disparate assemblies’ tenures would necessitate extensive amendments, legal contortions, and contingency plans for unforeseen dissolutions. The burden of managing a single, large-scale election could strain administrative capacities, and any failure or misconduct in such an event would affect governance at every level simultaneously.

Overall, while ONOE might offer some superficial efficiencies, the negative implications for India’s democratic health are profound. By diluting federalism, weakening accountability, and risking the concentration of political power, this reform—far from fortifying the democratic edifice—threatens to erode the pluralistic, citizen-centric values that underpin the Indian Constitution.

 

One Nation, One Election (ONOE)

 

One Nation, One Election (ONOE) is a proposal to synchronize India’s election cycles by holding Lok Sabha (general) and State Assembly elections simultaneously every five years. Proponents argue that ONOE could cut costs, reduce administrative burdens, and enhance governance efficiency. Critics, however, caution that it may undermine federalism and weaken democratic accountability. This paper provides a well-researched evaluation of ONOE, examining its historical context, potential advantages, and significant disadvantages.

 

Historical Background and Context

 

India’s early electoral history featured simultaneous elections. From 1951 to 1967, general and state assembly polls were conducted together. This period was marked by one-party dominance (the Indian National Congress) and relatively stable governments. However, the cycle of synchronized polls broke down post-1967 due to mid-term dissolutions of assemblies and Parliament, triggered by political upheavals and coalition instabilities. For instance, Kerala and Odisha saw assembly polls out-of-cycle in 1960 and 1961 following premature government collapses. The frequent invocation of Article 356 (President’s Rule in states) further disrupted synchronous election cycles. By the late 1960s and 1970s, India’s electoral landscape shifted to staggered elections, reflecting increased fragmentation and regionalization of politics.

 

Efforts to return to simultaneous polls have recurred for decades. The Election Commission first formally proposed reviving ONOE in 1983. In 1999, the Law Commission examined it, and in 2017 the government’s think tank (NITI Aayog) produced a detailed proposal. The idea regained momentum under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose government set up a high-level committee led by former President Ram Nath Kovind in 2023 to study ONOE. The Kovind Committee’s extensive report (over 18,000 pages) recommended synchronized polls as a “game changer,” citing economists’ projections that it could boost India’s GDP by up to 1.5%.

 

The government introduced two Bills in late 2024 to enable ONOE. One bill proposes the constitutional amendments necessary to hold Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections together, while the other synchronizes elections in union territories like Delhi and Jammu & Kashmir with the national schedule. These bills reflect the government’s seriousness, but their passage is uncertain. Amendments require a two-thirds parliamentary majority and ratification by at least half of state legislatures—a difficult threshold given that 47 parties consulted by the Kovind Committee were divided (32 in support, 15 opposed). As the next sections show, ONOE’s appeal lies in promised gains, but critics highlight formidable constitutional and practical challenges.

 

Potential Benefits of ONOE

 

1. Cost Savings and Economic Benefits: A primary argument for ONOE is the potential for significant reduction in election-related costs. Frequent staggered elections require repetitive expenditures on election administration, security, and campaigning across India’s nearly 1 billion voters. The Centre for Media Studies estimated that the 2019 general election cost over ₹60,000 crore (₹600 billion), making it among the world’s most expensive. ONOE could save upwards of ₹45 billion annually by consolidating these expenses. One study notes that annual cost savings from synchronized polls could exceed ₹45 billion, factoring in streamlined deployment of personnel and infrastructure. These savings could be redirected to development programs.

 

Beyond direct costs, supporters cite indirect economic gains. Currently, frequent elections hamper governance through the imposition of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which temporarily bars new policy initiatives before polls. According to Prime Minister Modi, frequent polls in the last five years cost India “800 days of governance” due to MCC-related delays. ONOE would reduce these interruptions, potentially sustaining policy momentum and spurring GDP growth. Indeed, the Kovind Committee report argues simultaneous polls would encourage governments to focus on capital expenditures rather than short-term “freebies” aimed at imminent elections. Economists Bibek Debroy and Kishore Desai (2017) even projected a GDP boost up to 1.5% if ONOE were implemented. While such figures invite debate, they underscore hopes that ONOE can alleviate the economic drag of perpetual campaigning.

 

2. Governance Efficiency and Stability: Proponents contend ONOE will yield a more efficient governance cycle, freeing leaders from continuous electioneering. In the current system, with one or more states going to polls every year, governments often remain in campaign mode, diverting attention from governance. ONOE promises a five-year uninterrupted governing window, enabling elected officials to plan and implement long-term policies. This uninterrupted tenure could allow the Lok Sabha and state assemblies to complete full five-year terms without the destabilizing specter of mid-term polls. Policy decisions might be bolder and more future-oriented if politicians are not perpetually calculating immediate electoral repercussions.

 

Additionally, ONOE could mitigate the “policy paralysis” that sets in with frequent elections. The theme paper by Dr. Sapna Chadah (2024) notes that frequent unsynchronized elections often disrupt governance machinery and slow developmental programs, an issue ONOE aims to address. By consolidating elections, administrative resources (such as security forces and polling staff, often school teachers and officials) would be concentrated once in five years, minimizing repeated disruptions to their regular duties. This could, for example, reduce how often education is interrupted when teachers are deployed for poll duty.

 

3. Reduction of Voter and Political Fatigue: Another anticipated benefit of ONOE is less voter fatigue. India’s electorate currently faces multiple elections in quick succession (national, state, and local bodies), which can lead to disillusionment and lower participation. Synchronized elections would condense the political campaign season, so citizens cast all their ballots in one go, potentially increasing turnout due to the heightened significance of a single massive election event. Voters may find it easier to engage with the electoral process when it occurs periodically rather than incessantly.

 

4. Policy Continuity and Long-Term Planning: With elections aligned, governments at the center and states might enjoy greater policy alignment and continuity. National and state regimes formed simultaneously could facilitate cooperative federalism, streamlining the implementation of nationwide programs without intermittent electoral pressures. Industries may experience more policy stability and less political uncertainty in a synchronized cycle. For instance, businesses often cite frequent elections as a cause of deferred investments; a single electoral cycle might smooth economic decision-making.

 

It’s important to note that these benefits hinge on effective implementation and broad political buy-in. The next section examines the numerous challenges and risks that accompany the ONOE proposal, many of which fuel the opposition from several political parties and analysts.

 

Challenges and Risks of ONOE

 

Despite the above potential advantages, ONOE faces significant criticisms and concerns. Key among them are threats to India’s federal structure, dilution of regional representation, questions about feasibility, and impacts on democratic accountability.

 

1. Threat to Federalism and Regional Autonomy: India’s Constitution envisions a federal system with power shared between the Union and states. Critics argue ONOE could tilt this balance in favor of the center, undermining the autonomy of state governments. A major concern is that simultaneous elections may lead to national issues dominating voter priorities at the expense of local issues. In a combined poll, voters might be swayed more by the national narrative (e.g., the prime ministerial candidate or national security issues), potentially overshadowing important state-level matters like regional development, local leadership, or cultural concerns. This dynamic could benefit larger national parties that set the national agenda, while marginalizing regional parties that champion local interests.

 

Empirical analyses support these worries: An IDFC Institute study of past simultaneous elections found that voters had a 77% likelihood of voting for the same party in both state and national races when elections were combined. This suggests a strong coattail effect, where the popularity of a national leader (or party) can sweep state candidates into office, even if state issues or qualifications differ. Over time, such trends could weaken the diversity of India’s multi-party system. Regional parties formed to address specific local grievances may be side-lined under a national wave. As one journal article notes, “national parties can mute the voice of smaller parties at the state level” if ONOE is adopted. Opponents like the Congress, Trinamool Congress, and Left parties explicitly argue that ONOE “weakens India’s federal structure and could diminish the autonomy of state governments”.

 

Furthermore, India’s diversity in language, culture, and regional aspirations means that a one-size-fits-all election could reduce the representation of minority or regional voices. Historically, the staggered election system has allowed voters to differentiate their choices: often favoring one party at the state level and another at the Centre, based on distinct issues. Voters can, for example, reward a regional party for good local governance while choosing a different party nationally. This nuanced voting behavior would be harder to exercise if elections are merged, potentially diminishing democratic nuance and local accountability.

 

2. Democratic Accountability and Frequency of Feedback: Frequent elections, while costly and tiresome, serve an important democratic function: they are regular accountability checkpoints. In the current system of elections every few months in some part of India, governments are constantly subject to voter approval or disapproval. D.K. Singh argues that “one nation, many elections” allows voters to keep politicians on a short leash. If politicians misgovern or unpopular policies (like demonetisation in 2016 or a flawed GST rollout) cause public hardship, upcoming state elections compel the government to respond or face electoral backlash. For instance, the central government rushed to alleviate cash shortages during demonetisation partly because key state elections loomed in early 2017. Similarly, discontent after the July 2017 GST implementation saw prompt tweaks to tax rules ahead of Gujarat’s assembly election. These examples show how staggered elections enhance responsiveness: ruling parties cannot ignore public opinion for long because another election is always around the corner.

 

Under ONOE, however, elected officials (both at Centre and states) would enjoy a fixed five-year tenure with no interim electoral tests. The fear is that, with voters only casting judgment once in five years, governments might become less responsive in the interim. As Singh cautions, “Give politicians a secure term of five years in power and see how they turn their back on voters for the next four years or so”. In other words, democratic accountability could suffer, as the electorate loses the ability to regularly reward or punish performance at different levels of government. By-elections would still occur for vacancies, but these are far less significant in scale and impact than full state elections as barometers of public mood.

 

3. Constitutional and Logistical Hurdles: Implementing ONOE is not just a political choice but a constitutional conundrum. The terms of state legislative assemblies and the Lok Sabha are currently independent. To synchronize them, several constitutional amendments would be required: notably to Articles 83, 85, 172, and 174 of the Constitution which govern the durations of Parliament and state assemblies and the powers to dissolve them, as well as adjustments to Article 356 (President’s rule) and possibly the introduction of new provisions to handle hung outcomes. Aligning terms could mean either curtailing or extending existing legislatures’ tenures, both of which raise legal and ethical concerns. Extending a legislature’s term undermines the people’s mandate, whereas curtailing terms would cut short a legitimately elected government’s tenure. The Kovind Committee’s idea is that if a government falls early, the replacement would only serve “until the next synchronised election,” potentially a truncated term. But to manage without frequent polls, either interim arrangements (President’s rule or caretaker governments) would be needed or India would need to curtail democratic processes—neither is ideal.

 

Logistically, conducting simultaneous elections in a vast country is a Herculean task. Ensuring enough Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and VVPATs for concurrent nationwide use is daunting. A 2015 Parliamentary Committee report estimated ₹92.84 billion would be needed just to procure the additional EVMs and VVPATs to facilitate ONOE. These machines also need periodic replacement (every 15 years or so), meaning the cost is recurring. The Election Commission of India (ECI) pegged this procurement cost around ₹9,300 crore in 2015. Moreover, conducting elections all at once requires training and deploying millions of officials and security personnel in a tightly coordinated manner. Given India’s size, even a phased simultaneous election (spreading voting over a few weeks) is resource-intensive. Any error or malfunction (e.g., EVM glitches, violence in a region) in a simultaneous poll could have a nationwide impact, unlike staggered polls where issues can be isolated and addressed in one state without undermining the entire electoral process.

 

4. “One Size Fits All” Complexity: ONOE assumes that a uniform electoral cycle suits the whole country, but India’s political reality is dynamic. Governments fall due to no-confidence motions, new alliances form, and sometimes early elections are themselves a democratic necessity (as was the case to break deadlocks in 1991 or 1998). Rigid synchronization might force unnatural scenarios where a state under President’s Rule waits years for the next nationwide election, leaving citizens disenfranchised of a state government for a prolonged period. Conversely, a popular state government might have to resign early to accommodate the nationwide timeline, effectively penalizing it for the sake of synchronization. This rigidity could strain the democratic fabric.

The ONOE system might also necessitate fewer election cycles for local bodies (panchayats and municipalities) to avoid continuous local polls undercutting the intended relief. The Kovind Committee suggested scheduling local body elections within 100 days of the general/assembly polls. Even if achieved, that means one year could see an intense all-level election marathon, which itself is a significant undertaking.

 

Critics further warn of the psychological impact on voters. With a ballot that may include choices for Parliament, State Assembly, and possibly local bodies simultaneously, the voting process becomes more complex. Voter education and awareness need to rise significantly to ensure that people can make informed, differentiated choices for each level of government. The academic article by Vivek Kumar (2023) points out that voters exhibit different political behaviors in national vs. state elections, and it might be “very hard for them to choose candidates” appropriately if confronted with multiple decisions at once. There is a risk that the nuance of local governance could be lost in the noise of a mega-election.

 

5. Risks to Pluralism and Opposition Voice: A subtler risk of ONOE is that a sweeping simultaneous victory could potentially create a dominant-party lock-in, marginalizing the opposition for long periods. If a single party (or coalition) were to win decisively in a simultaneous election, it could control Parliament and a majority of state assemblies in one go. Given India’s Westminster model, this might reduce checks and balances, especially if the upper house (Rajya Sabha) also eventually aligns with that wave. D.K. Singh notes opposition concerns that a “Modi wave” (or any future national wave) could render the opposition “jobless for five years at least”, eliminating the mid-term comebacks that currently rejuvenate opposition parties in various states. While Singh also argues voters can distinguish issues even in simultaneous polls, the fear of a democracy with weakened opposition is not unfounded. Healthy democracy thrives on a robust opposition and continuous political contestation, which ONOE might inadvertently dampen.

 

In summary, the challenges to ONOE are multifaceted: constitutional amendments and legal changes (including potentially contentious ones) are pre-requisites; operational feasibility is uncertain and expensive in its own right; and the impact on India’s democratic ethos—federalism, pluralism, and accountability—could be adverse. These concerns form the crux of the argument against ONOE, as expanded in the concluding section.

 

Dr. Subramanian Swamy’s Views on ONOE

 

Dr. Subramanian Swamy, a BJP ideologue and former Union Minister, has been a prominent voice discussing simultaneous elections. His perspective offers insight into how a supporter of ONOE balances the concept’s merits with its practical challenges. According to an ANI interview from July 2018, Swamy “backed the idea of having simultaneous elections” in principle. He questioned the rationale of “wasting money on an annual basis” for frequent elections, especially when each “has become a national election” drawing in the Prime Minister and central leadership for campaigning. This aligns with the cost-saving and efficiency arguments outlined earlier—Swamy saw ONOE as a way to streamline political focus and reduce unnecessary expenditure.

 

However, Dr. Swamy also acknowledged loopholes and pre-conditions that must be addressed for ONOE to work. A major issue he highlighted was handling situations when governments fall mid-term. He cited historical instances like Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government in 1999 and I.K. Gujral’s government in 1997, both of which lost majority support and triggered unscheduled Lok Sabha elections. “Midterm elections are very expensive and very painful,” Swamy remarked, suggesting that a system prone to such collapses undermines the very efficiency ONOE seeks. To mitigate this, Swamy pointed to Germany’s constructive vote of no-confidence as a solution: “the party that moves the no-confidence motion [must] produce the majority [for an alternative government] otherwise the ruling party…will continue in office.” This effectively means no mid-term election unless there is a clear replacement government, thus stabilizing the tenure of legislatures. Swamy implied that importing such a mechanism could plug a critical loophole in implementing ONOE in India.

 

Swamy’s support also seemed conditional on whether the opposition parties cooperated. He noted, “It is up to [the opposition] whether they wanted to support it or not,” implying that consensus would be needed. His remark came as the Law Commission was meeting parties on this matter, where Congress and CPI(M) were skeptical (and even absent). By framing ONOE as a “very good objective” depending on opposition stance, Swamy recognized that the reform could not be unilaterally imposed without risking political backlash or constitutional impropriety.

 

Interestingly, while Swamy initially aligned with the core ONOE arguments of saving money and reducing campaign frequency, he did not dismiss concerns as mere partisan fear. Instead, he actively engaged with the critical “what if” scenarios (like a government’s collapse) and provided a comparative example (Germany’s model) to spark debate on solutions. This illustrated that Swamy’s views on ONOE combined advocacy with a recognition of the need for accompanying reforms (like changing the no-confidence motion rules). However, in 2024, Swamy dramatically changed his stance, calling ONOE a concept “of Mohammed bin Tughlaq” and criticizing Prime Minister Narendra Modi for promoting it, stating, “The same madness has afflicted Narendra Modi and his Chalis Buddhus.” This reversal underscores Swamy’s evolving assessment, where he appears to have shifted from conditional support to outright opposition, possibly due to concerns about its feasibility or political motives.

This evolution in Swamy’s position reflects the broader debate around ONOE—while it may present theoretical advantages, its practical challenges and constitutional implications continue to make it a contested reform.

 

Conclusion: ONOE’s Democratic Dilemma

 

After evaluating both the advantages and disadvantages, it becomes evident that while One Nation, One Election offers some attractive administrative and economic benefits, it poses serious risks to the health of India’s democracy. This paper concludes that implementing ONOE would be detrimental to democracy in India. The concluding argument in support of this stance is two-fold: the democratic costs outweigh the efficiency gains, and the purported benefits are either unsubstantiated or achievable through less disruptive reforms.

 

Firstly, dilution of federalism and loss of regular accountability are too high a price for potential cost savings. India’s democratic fabric is sustained by its plurality and federal power-sharing. ONOE threatens to unravel this by centralizing electoral contests and amplifying national narratives at the expense of local governance. The ability of voters to focus on state issues and hold their state governments accountable in mid-term is an intrinsic strength of the current system. Removing that would weaken the chain of accountability that links citizens, state leaders, and the central leadership. The question, as raised by critics, is poignant: Are the so-called advantages of synchronized elections worth sacrificing citizens’ rights and opportunities to keep politicians on a short leash? The answer tilts towards “no.” Democracy is not just about conducting elections cheaply; it’s fundamentally about ensuring those elections empower the voter. A system that potentially grants five-year unbroken tenure to all governments risks creating an unresponsive political class for the bulk of the term.

 

Secondly, many projected benefits of ONOE are either overstated or attainable through alternative measures. The financial savings, often touted as a primary benefit, may not be as large as projected when considering the one-time costs of new voting machinery (₹9,300 crore as per ECI) and the complexity of replacement cycles. D.K. Singh’s analysis highlights that detailed accounts of savings are missing, and prior estimates suggested only modest differences when comparing one big election vs. many small ones. For example, if the 2014 general election cost ₹3,870 crore and a simultaneous election might cost ₹4,500 crore, the net savings (if any) appear minor against the backdrop of India’s GDP. Good governance and development are more hampered by policy choices than by election schedules. If the Model Code of Conduct is a hindrance, its duration can be curtailed or its provisions reformed without overhauling the entire election cycle. And if excessive campaign spending is the worry, stricter campaign finance regulation and transparency (a point even opposition parties make) could address it better than ONOE.

 

Moreover, while voter fatigue is real, it can be tackled through voter education and engagement initiatives rather than a wholesale merger of elections. The spectacle of a giant simultaneous election might actually overwhelm voters and election machinery alike, introducing new forms of fatigue and confusion. Incremental reforms – like holding state elections in a few synchronized clusters (as some suggest two phases for all states) – could reduce frequency without stifling federalism. These alternatives find little room in an ONOE paradigm which tends to be presented as all-or-nothing.

 

Crucially, no democracy as large and complex as India’s has tried something exactly like ONOE in a parliamentary system. Smaller countries or those with presidential systems (like Indonesia or South Africa) conduct joint elections, but their contexts differ. India’s scale magnifies every risk. A failed simultaneous election (due to war, pandemic, or large-scale technical failure) would plunge the entire nation into a constitutional crisis, whereas in the current system a problem in one state doesn’t derail others.

 

In the end, the ONOE debate forces us to weigh efficiency vs. representation. This paper finds that representation, accountability, and federal balance must take precedence in a democracy. Echoing D.K. Singh’s assertion: Opposition parties should indeed oppose ONOE not out of fear of any individual leader (“Modi phobia”), but to uphold citizens’ rights to keep their rulers in check. That is a cornerstone of democratic governance.

 

Therefore, while acknowledging ONOE’s good intentions—saving public money, reducing campaign overdrive, and fostering policy continuity—the evidence suggests that these can be pursued through less radical means. Conversely, the damage ONOE could inflict on India’s democratic norms and federal polity might be irreversible or, at the very least, too costly to gamble on. In a diverse democracy, staggered elections are a feature, not just a bug; they reflect and reinforce the idea that “all politics is local” and that governance must continuously answer to the people. Ensuring that India’s unity is preserved not by homogenizing its elections but by respecting its plurality is key. Thus, One Nation, One Election — however well-intended — appears detrimental to the world’s largest democracy, and resisting it is in service of preserving the ethos of accountable and representative governance that India has painstakingly built since 1950.

 

References 

 

 1. Nikita Yadav, Decoding India’s “One Nation, One Election” plan, BBC News (17 Dec. 2024).

 

2. Bhaswat Prakash, One Nation One Election: A Comparative Analysis from Voter Behavior to Political Polarization, SSRN (2023).

 

3. D.K. Singh, ‘One Nation, One Election’ is a bad idea — and not because of Opposition’s ‘Modi phobia’, ThePrint (16 Dec. 2024).

 

4. Arunav Chetia, One Nation, One Election: What It Could Mean for India, Social & Political Research Foundation Issue Brief (Feb. 2020).

 

5. Vivek Kumar, One Nation One Election: Indian Perspective, 5(1) Int’l J. of Political Science & Governance 165 (2023).

 

6. Sapna Chadah, Theme Paper on “One Nation, One Election”, Indian Institute of Public Administration (2024).

 

7. Swamy backs simultaneous elections, Business Standard (ANI report, 8 Jul. 2018).

 

8. Lok Sabha Secretariat, 79th Report: Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections, Parliament of India (Dec. 2015).

 

9. Bibek Debroy & Kishore Desai, Analysis of Simultaneous Elections, NITI Aayog Discussion Paper (2017).

 

10. Quraishi S.Y., Costs and Consequences of One Nation, One Election, Indian Express (2023).

 

11. D.K. Singh, One Nation, One Election smacks of Delhi-knows-best mindset. All politics is local., ThePrint (Nov. 2024).

 

D.K. Singh, Politically Correct: ONOE and Citizens’ Rights, ThePrint (Dec. 2024).

 

Election Commission of India, Annual Report 1983 (1983).

 

Law Commission of India, 170th Report on Electoral Reforms (1999).