Authored by
Chi. Jayanthan. V.T.S
Law Student,
Sastra Deemed University
mailto:jayanthanvts004@gmail.com
1. FULL MATRICS OF THE CASE:
In this case, the petitioners published an article titled "STORY OF LOAN and Blittz Thackersey Libel Case" in the weekly newspaper "Mainstream." “ which was the decision of the libel suit filed against the weekly newspaper called “Blitz” and it’s editor, by one Krishnaraj Thackersey.the suit was decided by JusticeTarkunde in favor of Thackersey and a sum of rupees 3 lakhs was decreed.
In this case, the disputed article was a skillful attempt on the part of the writer to impute dishonesty and lack of integrity to justice Tarkunde in that libel suit. The writer says that the Khare-tarkunde Private Limited of Nagpur, the partners of that company including the father and two brothers of Justice Tarkunde had received a bank loan of rupees 10 lakhs from the bank of India. It was stated in the article that the date on which the 10 lakhs loan facility was granted by the bank of India was about five and a half months after the takersey-blitz libel suit had begun and just over six weeks before Justice Tarkunde began delivering his “marathon judgment “ on Jan 19, 1965.
It was then stated that a bank loan for rupees 10 lakhs was granted to Khare-tarkunde, The New India Assurance Co. stood guarantee and two directors of the Bank of India who voted in favor of granting the loan were Thackersey and Jaisinh Vithaldas (believed to be a relative of Thackersey).further the writer says that one of the Directors in new assurance who stood guarantee for the bank loan was N.K.Petigara, who is the solicitor of Thackersey in
the Blitz-Thackersey libel case before Justice Tarkunde.the writer laid stress on the fact that Khare Tarkunde’s indebtedness to various financiers to the tune of rupees 14 lakhs and he had only 5 lakhs capital revealed by the balance sheet of June 1964. Thus Khare-tarkunde is stated to be a lucky person to get this handsome loan of rs 10 lakhs from the bank of India.
The writer continues, "there must not be permitted to raise even the faintest whisper of any misgiving on that account," referring to the unquestionable integrity and reputation of the Bombay High Court judges. It is appropriate to repeat paragraph 24: -
“It is up to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court, including Justice Tarkunde, as well as the ever-vigilant members of the Bar to consider all the implications of these disclosures, which have distressed a common citizen like me, so that the best traditions of our judiciary may be upheld. If Sri Krishna Thackersey did not make this information clear at the time of the suit”
The State of Maharashtra brought a suit before the Bombay High Court, claiming that the aforementioned article included scandalous charges, was intended to hinder the administration of justice and constituted severe contempt of court. The story contained numerous inaccuracies and omissions of facts, and it claimed to have information about the transaction between Khare-Tarkunde and the Bank that was untrue.
2. ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT:
3. ARGUMENTS FOR THE PARTIES:
The state of Maharashtra argued before the Bombay high court that the aforementioned article contained scandalous allegations, was intended to obstruct the administration of justice, and constituted gross contempt of court. The article purported to state certain facts about the transaction between Khare-Tarkunde and the bank, which were false, and there were several misstatements and suppression of facts, including:
The article incorrectly stated that Mr Justice Tarkunde's father was a partner in Khare Tarkunde.
The transaction was mischaracterized in the report as a "loan" from the Bank to Khare- Tarkunde. In reality, the aforementioned transaction was a guarantee provided by the Bank, which agreed to reimburse the government for any sum up to Rs. 10 lacs should Khare- Tarkunde fail to fulfill its obligations. The New India Insurance Co. Ltd. additionally guaranteed the Bank, promising to protect it if it had to pay the stated amount or any portion of it.
Appellant no 2 who also happens to be the director and top officer of the first complainant filed a reply raising some expostulations of a legal and specialized nature and took up the position the disputed composition was grounded on the report published in “ prajatantra ” from which all the data were stated in composition were incorporated. It was asserted that certain ‘ major data ’ had been vindicated by the complainant and set up to be true. It was admitted that reading the solicitation for taking up disdain proceedings and it was set up by appellant no 2 that there were certain incorrect statements in the article. It was claimed that the composition had been published in a bona fide belief that whatever was stated in the composition in “ Prajatantra '' was true. the intention was to convey to the public at large that it was peremptory on the complainant Thackersey and Pettigara, one of the mates of Mulla & Mullaetc., his lawyers to inform Justice Tarkunde that the complainant had suggested for resolution of the board of directors of the bank of India which without reasonable distrustfulness would help Khare- Tarkunde in which Tarkunde happened to be the brother of the judge.
In this appeal, the attorney for appellant no. 2 has made an effort to show that there was no impugnation of dishonesty or aspersion of Judge Tarkunde's integrity in the article. His second claim is that libel lawsuits are the appropriate course of action in this case since contempt proceedings for scandalizing a judge are now out of date. Finally, it is asserted that there was no evidence presented to the High Court to support the claim that Judge Tarkunde was unaware of the deal or other interactions between the company his brother was a partner in and the bank that Thackersey was a director of. It is argued that the High Court should not have found appellant No. 2 guilty of contempt if the claims made in the article were true or had been made sincerely with the intent that they were true. In any case, the attorney claimed that the article's claims only supported an accusation of bias against the judge, and if such a claim is made, it cannot be viewed as contempt. About the first issue, the author of the paper has called our attention to several passages that express his or her highly held views regarding the Indian judiciary.It is implied that his goal was just to voice an objective critique of how the Thackersey lawsuit against the "Blitz" weekly was handled. It was emphasized in the story that the Rs. 3 lakhs in damages were nearly punitive, that it was unusual for the plaintiff (Thackersey) to decline to testify, and that a permanent injunction had been obtained banning Blitz from publishing any materials related to the dispute. The legislation governing press freedom fully justified such criticism of a decision or the proceedings in a legal case.
The author of the article indeed had the option of exercising his right to fair and reasonable criticism, and the issues raised in a few of the paragraphs may not warrant the initiation of any contempt proceedings, but when taken as a whole, the article makes clear that the High Court's rulings were exceptional.It was a clever attempt on the part of the author to infer dishonesty and a lack of integrity from Justice Tarkunde in the case of the Thackersey-Blitz lawsuit. The imputation was indirect and mostly made by implying that the transaction and dealings mentioned in the article were to blame for the suit of Thackersey's being decreed in the amount of Rs. 3 lakhs, which was the compensation claimed by Thackersey.
It shall also be stated that the article also says that Thackersey and his advocates were to blame in as much as they did not inform the judge about the bank loan transaction of Khare-Tarkunde with the bank of India with which Thackesey also associated in his capacity as the director but that cannot detract from the obvious implications and insinuations made in various paragraphs of the article which in turn created a prejudicial impact on the mind of the readers about the lack of honesty, integrity, and impartiality the role played by Judge Tarkunde in the Thackersey-Blitz case decision.
On the second point, the advocate for appellant no 2 has relied a great deal on certain decisions of the apex court of Australian and American courts. In the matter of a special reference from the Bahama Islands, a letter was published in a colonial newspaper that contained sarcastic allusions to a refusal by the chief justice to accept a gift of pineapples. No judgment was given by the privy council but their lordships made a report to her majesty that the impugned letter through that I might have been made the subject of proceedings for libel was not in those circumstances and It did not amount to contempt of court because it was intended to prevent or interact with the proper administration of justice or the process of justice.
In that situation, there was no concern about embarrassing the court, and the Chief Justice was not accused of any judicial wrongdoing in connection with any cases that were either before him or were resolved in his court. Based on the Privy Council's subsequent ruling in McLeod v. St. Aubyn, a lot of evidence has been gathered to show that courts, at least in England, no longer punish someone for contempt for publishing embarrassing information about them while a case is underway or being adjudicated.The case was an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of St. Vincent's Acting Chief Justice St. Aubyn sending one McLeod to jail for 14 days for alleged court contempt. In the contested publication, it was claimed, among other things, that Mr. Trifford had lost the public's trust and that Mr. St. Aubya had degraded the judiciary to the level of a clown with his locus tenons. Further, insulting and caustic statements concerning the Acting Chief Justice were made.
4. COURT’S INTERPRETATION:
The High Court also looked into the errors and inaccuracies in the contested article and found no evidence to support the allegation that Thackersey and his fellow directors at the Bank of India or Thackersey's solicitor and his fellow directors at the New India Assurance Co. went above and beyond to make accommodations for Khare-Tarkunde or that Khare-Tarkunde was a financially struggling company that was "lucky" to receive the sizeable loan.
The accusations that there was a connection between the loan and the verdict in the Blitz-Thackersey case, or that Judge Tarkunde was aware of or might have been aware of any loan being granted to his brother's company, were found to be unsupported by any evidence by the High Court.
The contestant was only trying to convey to the broader public what has previously been said, it was only contended that the terms used by the contestant did not give rise to the aforementioned imputations or innuendos. In the return or at the High Court argument, there was no attempt to rebut these suggestions. It is not essential to discuss the other matters that were brought up and settled by the High Court since they have not been discussed in front of us.
The article is well written, but it contains clear implications and hints that potentially affect the reader's image of Justice Tarkunde's lack of honesty, integrity, and impartiality in concluding the case.
The defendants in this case, Perspective Publications (P) Ltd and D.R. Goel, the publication's editor, printer, and publisher, were found in contempt of Mr. Justice Tarkunde in the course of his official capacity as a judge by the Bombay High Court.
The High Court carefully evaluated the implications of the material in each of the contested article's paragraphs and came to the unavoidable conclusion that, taken as a whole and without reading it beyond its plain meaning, it goes beyond the scope of fair and reasonable criticism. It is clear that this is an attempt to undermine the learned judge's standing as a judge, undermines public confidence in the High Court, and undermines the proper administration of justice in the court because it implies that there is some sort of tangential relationship between the loan that was provided to M/s. Khare Thackersey Pvt. Ltd. and the decision made by Mr. Justice Tarkunde in the "Blitz-Thackersey" case.
Examination tests laid down in the hon’ble apex court in various cases:
Whether the contested publication is just a defamatory attack on the judge or whether it is intended to obstruct the effective administration of justice by his court will be the determining factor in each case. Only in the latter scenario would it be considered contempt and subject to punishment.
Alternatively, the issue will be whether the judge was personally harmed or the general public. In Mukherjee, J.'s (as he was then) words, "Brahma Prakash Sharma's case"(1), "publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to discourage actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrass.
Regarding the third argument, the High Court received no evidence to support the veracity or accuracy of the facts reported in the article. Truthfulness or factual accuracy may be a strong defense in a libel case, but in the law of contempt, there aren't many English or Indian cases where such a defense has been upheld. There was indeed some debate regarding Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy's credentials as the author of the publication, but that conversation seemed to be held to settle the dispute that had been brought up at the time.
The argument presented was taken into account under the presumption that good faith can be used as a defense in a contempt case.
The phrase "even if good faith can be regarded to constitute a defense at all in a proceeding for contempt" demonstrates that this Court did not rule categorically that good faith can be raised as a defense in such proceedings. In any case, there was no attempt made before the High Court to establish the veracity of the facts mentioned in the article, thus this point is just of academic relevance. Nonetheless, it was determined that several of the relevant charges were wholly false and inaccurate.
Debi Prasad Sharma & Ors. v. King Emperor[1], where newspaper editorials or news reports scorned the fact that the chief justice of the Allahabad High Court, while exercising his administrative duties, sent a circular to the judicial authorities urging them to collect donations for the war fund. and implied that he had done something to lower the prestige of the court in the eyes of the public.
Again in Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobagoḍ[2] the law enunciated in Reg. v. Gray[3] by Lord Russel of Killowen was applied and it was said on page 335:
“But whether it is the authority and status of an individual judge or the proper administration of justice, no member of the public who exercises the ordinary right to criticize in good faith, privately or publicly, is doing anything wrong. made in court. The path of criticism is a public path; criminals are allowed to err in it; provided that members of the public refrain from imputing improper motives to those engaged in the administration of justice and actually exercise their right to criticism and do not act maliciously or attempt to obstruct the administration of justice, they are immune.It was, however, held that there was no evidence upon which the court could find that the alleged contemnor had exceeded fair and temperate criticism and that he had acted with untruth or malice “
We are now publishing the judgments of this Court. In Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. State of Madras[4], it was held that the fact that defamation of a judge of a lower court is under section 99 of the Indian Penal Code did not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain an action against the court. . At that time, an article was published in a Telugu weekly newspaper in which it was alleged that the District Magistrate of Kovvur was known to the residents of the place to have harassed the litigants in various ways, etc. Delivering judgment, Mukherjee J. (as he then was) described the article as a vicious attack on the integrity and honesty of the judiciary.
5. VERDICT:
The court noted that no effort was made to demonstrate that the facts provided in the article were accurate or based on reliable information. The claim of bias or the existence of a financial interest in Khare-Tarkunde was found to be unfounded because there was no evidence that Justice Tarkunde was a shareholder or otherwise connected to the company. The mere fact that his brother owned a portion of it does not prove that Justice Tarkunde would likewise have a financial stake in it.
In regard to the publication of the contested article, the appellant did not express any remorse. He didn't even offer a sincere apology.
Finally, it must be established that the argument that the allegations presented in the article only amounted to a bias charge against the judge and could not constitute contempt must be rejected. That is a fresh issue that has never been brought up before the High Court. Furthermore, it is completely unfounded to infer that Justice Tarkunde had any financial interest in Khare-Tarkunde, the company that transacted business with the bank where Thackersey served as a director, as a result of the legal bias charge made in the article. Counsel had to concur that Justice Tarkunde had no ownership stake in Khare-Tarkunde and that there was no evidence to support this.
Judge Tarkunde would not automatically have a financial or pecuniary interest in it just because his brother happens to own a stake in it. It is impossible to agree, and the attorney for appellant no. 2 has not taken such a strident stance, that a judge's brother or "close relative" is prohibited from engaging in any line of work. This argument is complete without merit throughout.
The second appellant has shown no remorse for publishing the contested piece. Never once did lying even offer an unequivocal apology. In these circumstances, the High Court had every right to punish him for contempt of court and to impose the term it did. According to the previously stated criteria, the impugned article clearly implied that Judge Tarkunde acted improperly, lacked integrity, and had ulterior motives when judging the Thackersey-Blitz case, which unquestionably constituted contempt of court. The appeal is dismissed since it is unsuccessful.
According to the Supreme Court, the decision of the High Court was fully justified in punishing Justice Tarkunde for contempt of court and in giving him the sentence of simple imprisonment for one month along with a fine because there was a clear imputation of improperness, lack of integrity, and oblique motives to Justice Tarkunde in the matter of deciding the Thackersey-Blitz suit, which, on the grounds already stated, undoubtedly constituted contempt of court.
The court stated that no attempt was made to prove the facts in the article based on correct or correct data. The allegation of bias or financial interest in Khare-Tarkunde was found to be baseless as there was no evidence that Judge Tarkunde was not a shareholder and had no interest in Khare-Tarkunde. The fact that his brother had shares in it does not in itself show that Judge Tarkunde also has financial interests in it.
In conclusion, the contention that the statements contained in the article contained only an accusation of partiality against the judge must be rejected and cannot be held in contempt. This is a new topic and it has never been discussed in the Supreme Court. In addition, the accusation in the article of judicial bias, suggesting that Judge Tarkunde had any financial interest in Khare-Tarkunde, which had dealings with a bank of which Thackersey was a director, is completely worthless.Counsel had to agree that Justice Tarkunde was neither a shareholder nor was there anything to show that he had any other interest than Khare- Tarkunde. The mere fact that his brother happens to own it does not by itself show that Judge Tarkunde has any economic or financial interest in it either. Such extreme view cannot be accepted and counsel for appellant No. 3 did not take such extreme view. 2 The brother or close relative of a judge is prevented from operating in a business, profession or position. The whole argument on this point is without substance.
Appellant No. 2 did not regret the publication of the impugned article. lies never even apologized. In the circumstances, the Court of Appeal was fully justified in punishing him for non-trial and awarded him the prescribed sentence. The impugned article clearly condemned Judge Tarkunde for impropriety, lack of integrity, and ulterior motives in deciding the Thackersey-Blitz action, which, according to the principles already stated, undoubtedly amounted to contempt of court. The appeal is dismissed.
The Supreme Court said that, as in the impugned article, Judge Tarkunde was clearly accused of impropriety, lack of integrity, and ulterior motives in deciding the Thackersey-Blitz action, which, on the principles already stated, undoubtedly constituted contempt of court, the judgment of the High Court was fully justified that he was punished with for contempt of court and sentenced to one month's imprisonment with a fine of Rs.. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine he was punished with simple imprisonment for the same period.
6.CASE COMMENTARY:
When taken as a whole, the article's many lines' evident meanings and institutions have a significant impact on the reader's perception of the judge's honesty, integrity, and impartiality in handling the defamation case.
Everyone has the right to voice fair, reasonable, and legal criticism of any action or conduct that a judge takes while acting in their official role as a judge, as well as the right to offer an appropriate and fair opinion on any ruling that the judge renders. But, if a piece of writing accuses the judge of acting out of illegitimate motivations, it goes beyond the bounds of legitimate and reasonable criticism and also clearly threatens the court's honour and reputation, which is considered contempt of court.
It would not be accurate to claim that court scandals have rendered committals for contempt of court unnecessary.
(A) Nonetheless, such summary jurisdiction by means of contempt must be used with extreme care and discretion, and only when it is required for the proper dispensation of justice.
(B) There is a difference between simple libel or defamation of a judge and actions that might constitute contempt of court.
The tests include:
(i) Is the contested publication only a defamatory attack on the judge, or is it intended to obstruct justice or the proper execution of the law by his court? And
(ii) Was the Judge personally wronged, or was the general public?
The public will suffer harm from the publication of a defamatory statement if it tends to raise concerns about the judge's fairness, competence, or integrity among the general public, or if it discourages litigants from fully relying on the court's administration of justice, or if it is likely to embarrass the judge in the performance of his judicial duties.
In the current case, no effort was taken to substantiate "that the statements mentioned in the article were accurate or were predicated on correct data," assuming that good faith can be deemed to be a defense in a proceeding for contempt. On the other hand, it was proven that several of the relevant claims were wholly false and inaccurate. It is not enough to show that the Judge would have a financial interest in the company to qualify as biased just because his brother happened to have a financial stake in it.
You should always try to find volume and issue number for journal articles.
Nyayavimarsha
No. 74/81, Sunderraja nagar, Subramaniyapuram, Trichy- 620020